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Recent Developments 
In re: Maurice M.: CIVIL CONTEMPT 
ORDER DIRECTING MOTHER 
SUSPECTED OF CHILD ABUSE TO 
PRODUCE THE JUVENILE HELD 
TO VIOIATE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in In 
re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391,550 A.2d 1135 
(1988), held that a civil contempt order 
from the Juvenile Court which directed a 
mother suspected of child abuse to pro-
duce her son before the court or to reveal 
his exact whereabouts violated her fifth 
amendment right to avoid self-
incrimination. The mother's act of produ-
cing the juvenile before the court is 
implicitly a testimonial communication by 
which she could incriminate herself in the 
circumstances of this case, and so falls 
within the protection afforded by the fifth 
amendment. 
Maurice M. is the son of Jacqueline 
Bouknight. In January 1987, at the age of 
three months, Maurice was admitted to the 
hospital with a broken leg. This injury and 
the presence of other, partially healed frac-
tures on his body, together with his 
mother's history of emotional problems 
and the fact that his father had just been 
released from prison for drug violations, 
prompted the Baltimore City Department 
of Social Services (DSS) to obtain an au-
thorization from the Juvenile Court in 
February 1987 to provide shelter care for 
Maurice. The child was placed in foster 
care until July 17, 1987, at which time the 
Shelter Care Order was modified and 
Maurice was returned to Bouknight. 
At a hearing on August 18, 1987, 
Maurice was found to be a child in need of 
assistance (CINA) under Md. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Code Ann. §§ 3-801(e)-3-804. As 
such, he was placed under an Order of Pro-
tective Supervision to DSS .. Under this 
order, Bouknight retained custody of 
Maurice, agreed to "cooperate" with DSS, 
to utilize the assistance of a parent aide, 
and to refrain from physically punishing 
the child. Bouknight, however, failed to 
cooperate with DSS. Maurice was last seen 
on March 23, 1988. 
On April 18, 1988, DSS filed a Motion 
for Contempt against Bouknight, alleging 
that she had refused to provide the wherea-
bouts of Maurice to DSS representatives 
who visited her home on April 7. At a 
hearing before the Juvenile Master on 
April 20, which Bouknight did not attend, 
DSS was awarded custody of Maurice due 
to Bouknight's failure to comply with the 
Order of Protective Supervision. The 
court also held a hearing on the contempt 
motion and ordered Bouknight to show 
cause why she should not be held in con-
tempt for failure to produce the child in 
court. 
Bouknight was arrested and appeared 
before the court on April 27, 1988. She 
told the court, although the was not under 
oath and no fifth amendment objections 
were raised at the time, that Maurice was 
in Texas with her sister. A police investiga-
tion revealed that Maurice had not been 
seen by Bouknight's sister, and on April 
28, Bouknight was found in contempt for 
not producing Maurice or revealing his 
whereabouts. Counsel responded that 
Bouknight's opportunity to purge herself 
of the contempt was not a constitutional 
one if "her purging herself may involve 
admitting to a crime of some sort." Id. at 
396, 550 A.2d at 1137. 
On May 18, 1988, Bouknight moved to 
strike the contempt order on fifth amend-
ment grounds. She contended that the 
basis of the contempt order was that she 
must produce statements or evidence that 
might incriminate her. The court rejected 
the argument, finding that Bouknight was 
not required to give any testimony, but 
only to perform an act, i.e., to produce the 
child. Failure to produce Maurice was the 
reason the contempt order was issued, not 
any failure to testify. Bouknight appealed 
this ruling, and the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari prior to a 
decision by an intermediate appellate court 
to consider this important issue. 
The court stated that the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination 
"protects a witness from being required to 
make disclosure, otherwise compellable in 
the trial court's contempt power, which 
could incriminate him in a later criminal 
prosecution." Whitaker'lJ. Prince George's 
County, 307 Md. 368, 385, 514 A.2d 4 
(1986). Although the historic function of 
the fifth amendment privilege has been to 
protect an individual from self-
incrimination through his own testimony, 
the court examined several Supreme Court 
cases in which fifth amendment protection 
was also sought by individuals under court 
order to produce documents and other 
physical evidence. 
In Fisher 'lJ. United States, 425 V.S. 391 
(1976), the Court held that a client's fifth 
amendment privilege was not violated by 
enforcing a summons directing his attor-
ney to produce the client's documents, 
since the client was not thereby compelled 
to be a witness against himself. But, in 
United States 'lJ. Doe, 465 V.S. 605 (1984) 
(Doe I), the Court held that the act of 
producing the subpoenaed business 
records of a sole proprietorship was privi-
leged. Complying with the subpoena, the 
Court reasoned, tacitly conceded the exist-
ence of the records, their possession or 
control by the party under subpoena, and 
the authenticity of the records. Id. at 613. 
Hence, the act of producing the docu-
ments had testimonial aspects and an 
incriminating effect. 
In Doe 'lJ. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341 
(1988) (Doe 11), the Court affirmed its Doe 
I stance that "the act of production could 
constitute protected testimonial communi-
cation, because it might entail implicit 
statements of fact: by producing docu-
ments in compliance with a subpoena, the 
witness would admit that the papers exist-
ed, were in his possession or control, and 
were authentic." Id. The Court held that 
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the compelled execution of consent forms 
authorizing foreign banks to disclose 
records of the defendant's accounts did not 
infringe upon the fifth amendment privi-
lege, because neither the consent form nor 
its execution communicated any factual 
assertion. The Court explained that "to be 
testimonial, an accused's communication 
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate 
an actual assertion or disclose information 
[because] [o]nly then is a person compelled 
to be a 'witness' against himself." fd. 
Similarly, in United States v. Campos· 
Serrano, 430 F .2d 173 (7th Cir. 1970), the 
court found a violation of the fifth amend-
ment priv~lege when a defendant was 
coerced into producing a forged alien regis-
tration card. The court ruled that, in prcr 
ducing the card, the defendant implicitly 
admitted the existence, location and con-
trol over the card and so was "compelled 
to produce the crime itself." fd. at 176. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland rec-
ognized, in the case sub judice, that Bouk-
night had a reasonable apprehension of 
prosecution if, in accordance with the 
court's order, she produced Maurice or 
revealed his whereabouts, and the informa-
tion disclosed that the child had suffered 
further abuse or was even dead. If a crime 
has been committed upon Maurice's per-
son, Bouknight, by disclosing the deman-
ded information, would be incriminating 
herself. The court ruled that such commu-
nication, whether in the form of the com-
pelled act of production or verbal 
disclosure, is implicitly a testimonial com-
munication and so falls within the contem-
plation of the fifth amendment privilege. 
The court also addressed the State's argu-
ment that Bouknight waived her fifth 
amendment privileges when she told the 
court that Maurice was in Texas. The 
court noted that Bouknight was not a 
witness when she imparted this informa-
tion, nor was she under oath, and the inac-
curate information she revealed was not 
directly incriminating. Thus, the court 
ruled that Bouknight's fifth amendment 
privilege remained intact. 
The State's alternative contention that 
the public right to protect its children, as 
manifested by the Juvenile Causes Act, 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 
3-801-3-836 (1984), outweighs Bouk-
night's fifth amendment privilege was 
rejected by the court. Although the court 
recognized the validity of the State's argu-
ment that applying the constraints of the 
fifth amendment in cases of child abuse 
would afford a parent "carte blanche to 
conceal any negative information about 
the child's status and thereby strip the 
Juvenile Court of its ability to protect 
children suspected of being abused," it 
held that case law does not favor statutory 
requirements over constitutional protec-
tion when there is a strong possibility of 
incrimination. Maurice M. at 408, 550 A.2d 
at 1143. Under the circumstances of this 
case, where the risk to Bouknight of prose-
cution is so substantial, the court could not 
totally expunge Bouknight's fifth amend-
ment rights. Thus, the court vacated the 
civil contempt order. 
In a strong dissent, Judge McAuliffe 
stated that by producing Maurice, Bouk-
night would implicitly admit that 1) the 
child is Maurice, and that 2) she has suffi-
cient control and dominion over the child 
to produce him. Although these facts 
might be used against Bouknight in a 
criminal prosecution, Judge McAuliffe 
argued that communications which can be 
classified as foregone conclusions or as self-
evident information are of minimal testi-
monial significance, and consequently 
should not be afforded fifth amendment 
protection. Since Maurice could be identi-
fied solely by the scope of his injuries, and 
since evidence of who had control and 
dominion over the child furnishes no evi-
dence of who had control over him at the 
time of his injuries, no significant evidence 
which merits fifth amendment protection 
can be gleaned from the production of 
Maurice. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
vacated a civil contempt order of the 
Juvenile Court by which a mother 
suspected of child abuse was directed to 
produce the juvenile before the court or 
disclose his whereabouts. Under the cir-
cumstances of the case, the court decided 
that the mother's act of producing the 
child had testimonial implications that 
could incriminate her in the event of a 
criminal prosecution. Thus, the mother's 
claim of privilege under the fifth amend-
ment was upheld. 
- Mary fo Murphy 
Richmond v. Croson Co.: SUPREME 
COURT INVALIDATES SET-ASIDE 
PLAN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE 
JOBS FOR MINORITIES 
The United States Supreme Court struck 
down a city ordinance that channeled 30% 
of public funds to minority-owned con-
struction companies because it violated the 
fourteenth amendment's equal protection 
clause. Richmond v. Croson Co. 57 
U.S.L.W. 4132 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989). For 
the first time, a majority of the Court has 
adopted strict scrutiny as the standard for 
equal protection review of race-conscious 
legislation. 
The Richmond City Council adopted 
the Minority Business Utilization Plan 
("the Plan"), a minority set-aside program 
that required prime contractors of city 
construction projects to subcontract at 
least 30% of the dollar amount of the con-
tract to Minority Business Enterprises 
(MBEs). The Plan was modeled after the 
congressional program in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), which was 
held constitutional. The Plan's propon.ents 
claimed, inter alia, that although Rich-
mond's general population was 50% black, 
only .67% of the city's prime construction 
contracts had been awarded to MBEs in a 
five-year period. Thus, the plan was 
declared "remedial." 
A facial challenge to the ordinance was 
brought in 1983 by J .A. Croson Co. 
("Croson"), a white-owned plumbing 
company which lost a $126,000 contract to 
provide plumbing fixtures for the city jail. 
Croson, the sole bidder on the project, 
tried to comply with the set-aside require-
ment but was unable to obtain any MBEs 
to subcontract for the job. Croson sought 
waiver of the set-aside requirement, indi-
cating that the MBEs contacted were either 
unqualified, unresponsive, or unable to 
quote a bid. fd at 4436. Richmond denied 
Croson's request and decided to rebid the 
project. fd. 
Because the Plan was patterned after the 
program in Fullilove, both the federal dis-
trict court and the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit relied on the Fullilove 
precedent and upheld the Plan. Croson 
sought certiorari; the Supreme Court 
vacated the court of appeal's decision and 
remanded the case in light of Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 
(1986). On remand, the court of appeals 
struck down the Plan because it violated 
both prongs of strict scrutiny under the 
equal protection clause. 
In an opinion written by Justice O'Con-
nor, the Court held that strict scrutiny was 
the proper standard of review, and that the 
Plan failed both prongs of that test: (1) that 
the state had a compelling interest; and (2) 
that its Plan was narrowly tailored to a-
chieve that interest. As to the first prong of 
the test, the Court held that the city failed 
to "demonstrate a compelling interest in 
apportioning public contracting oppor-
tunities on the basis of race" because it 
adduced no evidence of "any identified dis-
crimination in the Richmond construction 
industry." Croson at 4142. Although Rich-
mond argued that it was attempting to 
remedy various forms of past discrimina-
tion, it did not offer specific acts of dis-
crimination, but rather it relied on general 
assertions of past discrimination coupled 
with the similar inference drawn from 
various statistical disparities. Richmond 
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